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Marburg hemorrhagic fever was detected among 4 miners in Ibanda District, Uganda, from June through
September, 2007. Infection was likely acquired through exposure to bats or bat secretions in a mine in
Kamwenge District, Uganda, and possibly human-to-human transmission between some patients. We describe
the epidemiologic investigation and the health education response.
Marburg hemorrhagic fever (MHF) is an acute, severe
febrile illness caused by Marburg virus (MARV; family,
Filoviridae). After an incubation period of up to 21 days
(typically 5–10 days), a sudden onset of fever, headache,
and myalgia develops; hemorrhagic signs ensue within
6–8 days after onset [1]. The resulting small vessel
damage and multisystem organ failure can be fatal.
MHF outbreaks are rare, resulting from human expo-
sure to a presumed zoonotic reservoir [2], and are fre-
quently ampliﬁed by secondary person-to-person
transmission through contact with infectious body ﬂu-
ids and tissues [3]. Case-fatality rates for large MHF
outbreaks have ranged from 20% to 90% [4]; the largest
and deadliest outbreak occurred in northern Angola in
2005, with 374 cases and a case-fatality rate of 88% [5].
On 13 July 2007, the Uganda Ministry of Health
(MoH) was notiﬁed of a suspected case of viral hemor-
rhagic fever in a miner from Kamwenge District who was
hospitalized and died in Kampala. A second miner who
had been in contact with him was also hospitalized with
suspected viral hemorrhagic fever. This report describes
the epidemiologic investigation conducted by the MoH
in collaboration withtheCenters forDisease Controland
Prevention (CDC), World Health Organization (WHO),
and Me ´decins sans Frontie `res. The initial response was
followed by an information campaign by the Ugandan
MoH and the Uganda Wildlife Authority.
THE STUDY
The MoH convened a Marburg Task Force comprising
government ministries, nongovernmental organ-
izations, and international partner organizations. An
initial investigation revealed that both patients had
worked at Kitaka mine in Ibanda District and had lived
in a tent camp in the Kibale forest reserve surrounding
the mine. The tunnel mine was the roosting site of
thousands of bats. The remaining miners reported
working in the mine using little to no personal pro-
tective equipment (PPE), with use of only gloves, gum
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 boots, and occasionally hard hats reported; no one reported use
of masks, respirators, or goggles. Kitaka minewas operated from
1953 until the mid-1970s by a commercial mining company, at
which point the commercial operation ceased but local residents
could access open passages in an unofﬁcial capacity. From
September through December 2006, another commercial min-
ing operation reopened this mine,employing workers to expand
tunnels prior to the start of mining operations. On 6 August
2007, at the recommendation of the Marburg Task Force, the
Ugandan Department for Geological Survey and Mines ofﬁcially
closed Kitaka mine and a local miner was hired to help ensure
that mine access was restricted.
Asuspectedcase ofMHF wasdeﬁnedashaving anacuteonset
of fever with either 3 or more nonspeciﬁc symptoms or un-
explained bleeding at any time since 21 June 2007. A probable
case was deﬁned as a suspected case with a history of 1 of the
following in the 3 weeks prior to fever onset: travel to an
area where an MHF case had occurred; direct contact with
bodily ﬂuids from a person or animal with probable or con-
ﬁrmed MHF; or work in a laboratory or animal facility handling
MARV. A conﬁrmedcase was deﬁnedasa suspectedor probable
case with laboratory evidence of recent MARV infection by
virus isolation antigen-detection enzyme-linked immunosor-
bent assay (ELISA), anti-MARV immunoglobulin M (IgM) or
immunoglobulin G (IgG), immunohistochemistry, or reverse-
transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) and
sequencing [6, 7].
Three conﬁrmed cases of MHF were identiﬁed with onset
occurring in June–July 2007; a fourth case occurred in Sep-
tember 2007 after closure of the mine. All 4 patients were male,
were aged 22–29 years, and worked at Kitaka mine. The index
case patient (patient 1), aged 29 years, presented to hospital A in
Kampala on 7 July with a 3-day history of fever, chills, headache,
and arthralgia. Three days after admission, he continued to be
febrile and began vomiting. On 13 July, he developed confusion,
seizures, hematemesis, and hematochezia, and died later that
day. A blood sample collected on 13 July was sent on 23 July to
CDC for testing. MARV was detected by RT-PCR and sub-
sequently by virus isolation (isolate no. 200702854) and ELISA
(Table 1).
Contact tracing revealed that 2 of patient 1’s co-workers
(patients 2 and 3) were ill prior to the onset of hisillness. Patient
2, aged 23 years, presented to a health center in Kamwenge
District on 21 June with fever, headache, arthralgia, and vom-
iting; he was transferred to hospital B in Ibanda District the next
day, where he developed apparent seizure activity. Patient 2 was
discharged on 29 June but had persistent weakness and dizziness
and was transported overnight to hospital C in Kampala District
on 1 July. He recovered and was discharged on 9 July.
Patient 3, aged 22 years, developed fever, arthralgia, and
headache in early June and traveled to a health center in Kam-
pala for treatment. Both patients 2 and 3 tested positive for anti-
MARV IgG by ELISA (Table 1). All 3 patients lived in the same
tent in the mining camp. Patients 1 and 3 had provided care to
patient 2 during his transportation to hospitals B and C.
Patient 4, aged 25 years, had onset of weakness and chills on
14 September. On 21 September he presented to a health
center in a suburb of Kyebando, located on the outskirts of
Kampala, with fever, headache, arthralgia, anorexia, and
hematemesis. Two weeks prior, he entered the mine without
PPE, despite being aware of the ongoing public health
response and having been hired to restrict access to the mine
following its ofﬁcial closure. He was transferred to hospital C
in Kampala, and MARV infection was conﬁrmed by virus
isolation (isolate no. 200703648), RT-PCR, and in convales-
cent samplesby anti-MARV IgG (Table 1). Sequencing of viral
isolates from patients 1 and 4 showed 20% divergence at the
nucleotide level, indicating that the 2 cases represented
separate introductions and were not epidemiologically linked
[8]. Some of the sequences obtained from the original bat
(Rousettus aegyptiacus) specimens and isolated viruses from
the same bats, sampled during the following ecological
investigation, matched very closely to the unique sequence of
the viruses isolated from the 2 patients [8].
We performed close monitoring of health workers and con-
tact tracing in all districts to which the 4 patients had traveled
from June through September 2007. Contacts were evaluated for
fever and other symptoms for 21 days after last contact. Of 267
contacts identiﬁed, 161 were able to be located and followed up;
83 contacts (73 in Kamwenge and Ibanda districts; 10 in Kam-
palaDistrict) provided blood samples for testing. Duringthe 21-
day incubation period, 24 (15%) and 3 (2%) of the 161 contacts
developed fever and bleeding, respectively; none of the contacts
had evidence of MARV infection by antigen-detection, IgM, or
IgG ELISA. Active surveillance for new cases continued in the
affected districts for an additional 21 days. No additional cases
were identiﬁed.
The number of MARV infections in this outbreak was
limited, although the risk of MHF exists as long as people
without PPE enter mines or caves inhabited by bats in areas
where MARV infection is endemic. There are no reasons to
believe that MARV exists only in Kitaka mine. The move-
ments of fruit bats are partly regulated by food abundance and
availability of spaces in the roosting areas. Some proportion of
the population migrates to other colonies on a seasonal basis
[9]. This risk of MARV being spread by bats was emphasized
by the subsequent identiﬁcation of 2 cases of MHF in tourists
visiting the Python cave in nearby Queen Elizabeth National
Park [10–12]. In the weeks following this cluster of cases,
Kitaka mine was ofﬁcially closed and the owner decided to
destroy the residing bat population by fumigation and by
closing the access to discourage recolonization by bats from
other locations. Educational campaigns that targeted com-
munities living around bat-inhabited caves and mines,
Marburg Hemorrhagic Fever, Uganda, 2007 d JID 2011:204 (Suppl 3) d S797
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 wildlife workers, and tourist groups were established in
Uganda by the MoH, the Wildlife Authorities, and the Tourist
Board with the support of CDC. A letter explaining the po-
tentials risks of entering any bat-inhabited cave was sent by
the MoH to the Association of Uganda Tour Operators.
Posters and leaﬂets were designed in English and local lan-
guages and distributed to target populations. Health messages
were posted on MoH and CDC Web sites. In recognition of
the economic impact of the tourism industry in the parks and
speciﬁcally Queen Elizabeth Park, it was decided that the site
would be redeveloped for bat observation while protecting the
health of the visitors. The park rangers received bat ecology
and MHF-related education training. A viewing platform was
erected at a safe distance to allow visitors to see the cave and
the bats from a covered structure during the day, when bat
movements in and out of the cave are limited. Educational
signage concerning the ecology of bats, the environment, and
M A R Vw a sp o s t e di nt h ec a m p g r o u n d ,o nt h et r a i l ,a n di nt h e
platform. All signs included speciﬁc warnings of the potential
for the bats to carry MARV.
CONCLUSIONS
This outbreak was limited to 4 conﬁrmed case patients, all of
whom were male miners with regular contact with bats or their
secretions. The association of MHF with mines and caves is likely
related to exposure to bats in a conﬁned space [2, 3]. Considering
the incubation period, it also remains possible that all 4 cases had
separate introductions. However, person-to-person transmission
may have occurred sequentially from patient 3 to patient 2 to
patient 1, although patient 3’s symptoms were mild, which makes
it unlikely that he transmitted the infection to either patient 1 or
patient 2. Without acute-phase samples from patients 2 and 3, it
is impossible to prove both the timing and the source of their
infection. Although the 2005 MHF outbreak in Angola included
a signiﬁcant number of cases from nosocomial transmission [5],
our contact tracing revealed no evidence ofhealth care–associated
infection. Barrier nursing and infection control are known to be
the most critical ways to prevent secondary transmission.
Surveillance for hemorrhagic fever, rapid testing of suspected
cases,institutionofinfectioncontrolmeasures,andeducationof
the community, health care workers, and other stakeholders are
critical to prevent and contain individual cases and outbreaks of
MHF.
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Table 1. Results of Marburg Virus–Specific Test Results of 4 Patients With Marburg Hemorrhagic Fever in Uganda, 2007
Patient, date of
symptom onset,
date of sample collection
Titer
Days after
symptom onset
MARV antigen
detection ELISA
a
Anti-MARV
IgM ELISA
Anti-MARV
IgG ELISA
b RT-PCR Virus isolation
1
4 July 2007
13 July 2007 9 4 Negative Negative Positive MARV
2
21 June 2007
1 August 2007 41 Negative Negative 400 ..
22 August 2007 62 . Negative 400 ..
29 August 2007 69 . Negative 400 ..
3
10 June 2007
1 August 2007 52 Negative Negative 400 ..
22 August 2007 73 . Negative 400 ..
29 August 2007 80 . Negative 400 ..
17 November 2007 160 . Negative 400 ..
4
14 September 2007
21 September 2007 6 Negative Negative Negative Positive MARV
24 September 2007 7 Negative Negative Negative Positive .
5 October 2007 20 Negative Negative 1,600 Negative .
NOTE. ELISA, enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay; IgG, immunoglobulin G; IgM, immunoglobulin M; MARV, Marburg virus; RT-PCR, reverse-transcription
polymerase chain reaction.
a For antigen detection, titers of .2 are considered to be positive.
b For IgG ELISAs, titers of R400 are considered to be positive.
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